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NOTES.
CARRIERS-DsCRIMINATION-SERVICES

OUTSIDE

OF

PUBLIC

PROFESSION-When a carrier goes beyond the scope of its public
profession or renders gratuitously to a portion of its patrons a

service which it does not hold itself out as willing to render for the
public in general, a form of discrimination arises quite as significant

in its legal aspect as discrimination in the matter of rates.

As to

the state of the law on the subject, there is no doubt," but in view of
the unusual practical importance of its effect when applied to existing conditions, its operation is interesting to observe.
Of such a result, a series of more or less related cases which

have come before the Interstate Commerce Commission furnish an
admirable illustration. In 1912 a confectionery merchant with a
"Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. People, s6 Ill. 365 (i870).

(3'oI)
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shop located at some distance from the center of the city of Washington, conceiving that he was being discriminated against by certain railroads in that city, in that store-door deliveries of interstate
freight consigned from certain points were being made free of
charge to merchants in Georgetown whose shops were situated at
a greater distance from the railroad station than his own, petitioned
the Interstate Commerce Commission for relief. Though the practice in question had been in existence for nearly thirty years, the
Commission found that discrimination existed and issued an order
directing its abatement. 2
Less than five months later a similar case came before the
Commission. 3 The citizens of Anacostia, a suburb, inspired by the
success of the earlier petition, urged that there was discrimination
in the extension of store-door deliveries to Georgetown and other
sections of Washington, when it was denied to them. The Commission found that this service was unjustly withheld from Anacostia and ruled accordingly.
But this matter was not destined to remain long of purely
local significance; the previous case' had paved the way for a case
of far greater consequence. 4 The carriers, influenced by the two
prior decisions, proposed to withdraw entirely the free-delivery
service from the city of Washington. The Commission properly
held that the motive of the carriers was immaterial, even though
it might be in retaliation to the former orders of the Commission,
and to avoid the extension to the points therein indicated, but held
that to withdraw the service at Washington would be discrimination
in favor of Baltimore, and so refused to allow it.
The final and climactic chapter in the story was thereupon
written when, in order to effect the withdrawal at Washington, the
service was withdrawn at Baltimore also. 5 An immediate protest
was voiced by the Merchants and Manufacturers' Association of
Baltimore, which contended that in view of the discontinuance of
the service, the existing rates were unreasonably high, but the Commission found the rates as continued neither unreasonable nor unjustly discriminatory.
Three cases involving this principle have recently come before
the Supreme Court of the United States. While the general rule as
laid down in The Express Cases' permits a carrier to discriminate
between patrons, such as other railroad companies with whom it is
2

Casassa v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 24 I. C. C. 629 (1912).
'Anacostia Citizens Association v. B. & 0. Railroad Co., 25 I. C. C. 411
(1912).

'Washngton, D. C. Store-Door Delivery, 27 I. C. C. 347 (1913).
'Merchants' & Manufacturers' Assn. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Company, 30 I. C. C. 388 (1914).
s 117 U. S. 1 (1886). For a discussion of the opposite view see 4 R. C. L.,
§ 6.

NOTES
not dealing as shippers, under the Act of 1887 a railroad is placed,
in its relation to other railroads and within certain limitations, in
substantially the same situation that it occupies in respect to shippers.7 This act, while prohibiting discrimination and compelling
the interchange of facilities, contains a proviso that a carrier shall
not be required to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities
to another carrier.
In Pennsylvania Company v. United States,' it was held that
an order of the Commission requiring a carrier to desist from its
practice of refusing to interchange carload freight with one connecting carrier within the switching limits of a city, while performing
such service in connection with other connecting carriers within
those limits, was not in violation of the proviso of the Act of 1887,
as requiring a carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities
to another carrier.
% In Louisville and Nashville Railroad v. United States" two
carriers furnished switching service to each other in their yards,
and to a third carrier on all except coal and competitive business. The
Commission directed the two carriers to eliminate this discrimination by furnishing such service to the third on all commodities for
which they furnished such accommodations for each other. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that this order was in violation of the Act of 1887 and constituted a violation of the constitutional provision against taking property without due process
of law. It was pointed out that the order in Pennsylvania Company
v. United States1" was to discontinue discrimination, while here
there was an affirmative order to devote their property to the use
of a competing carrier, but this argument apparently had no effect.
The last of the three cases has a more intimate bearing upon
the Washington delivery cases, since it involves services furnished
to individual shippers and not to connecting railroads. A railroad
company had erected six-ton scales adjacent to its stockyards in
fifty-four towns in Minnesota, which scales were not connected with
the tracks or buildings of the railroad. The Minnesota Commission ordered the installation of a similar scale in the village of
Bertha. The Supreme Court of Minnesota found that the scales in
question installed at fifty-four of the defendant's stations were not
used in the transactions between carrier and shippers. It appeared
that cattle actually shipped were weighed upon track scales after
the stock was loaded and not upon the scales at the stockyards.
The scales were used by dealers in buying and selling in the towns
where they had been placed, and though it clearly appeared that
'Act Feb. 4, 1887, 24 St. at L., 38o Chap. lO4, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 8565.
'236 U. S. 351 (1915).
'238 U. S. I (1915).
"Supra, note 8.
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these instruments had no direct part in transportation or selling
at terminal yards, they were convenient in stock dealings and
tended to bring business to a town and to give it an advantage over
a place where none existed. The railroad did not controvert the
finding that discrimination existed. The Supreme Court, however, held that the order directing the installation of an additional
scale amounted to the deprivation of property without due process
of law, and that the commission should have given the railroad the
alternative of abating the alleged discrimination by discontinuing
the use of existing scales.'1
The services complained of in this case unquestionably constituted a preference to the towns supplied, but it is interesting to
note, the further finding that they were wholly unconnected with
the arrier in its relations with shippers. In this particular the
Minnesota case differs essentially from the delivery cases, where
the services, though likewise gratuitous, were performed by the
carrier as carrier and bore a relation to the ordinary undertaking
of carriers, %iz., the transportation and delivery of goods. The
railroad, however, did not contest the finding that discrimination
existed and merely attacked the order of the Commission because
it was not in the alternative. The interesting question, therefore,
whether a carrier may favor a town by a gratuity entirely unconnected with transportation was not presented.
Such cases assume importance chiefly as striking examples of
the manner in which an apparently well-intentioned liberality on the
part of carriers toward a considerable portion of their patrons is
often frustrated by the objection of the minority to the apparent
economic prejudice of the public at large. But upon the assumption that equality of opportunity is of paramount public importance
no other conclusion is possible.
B.M.K.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-DOES A

STATE WORKMEN'S

COM-

PENSATION LAW APPLY TO AN EMPLOYEE OF AN INTERSTATE RAILINTERSTATE COMMERCE?-The question
as to whether the Federal Employers' Liability Act and a state
workmen's compensation act can both be applied to regulate the
liability of an interstate railroad for injury to an employee engaged
in interstate commerce,-the former covering injuries resulting from
negligence and the latter covering injuries not resulting from negligence,--has recently been decided in the affirmative by the New
ROAD WHEN ENGAGED IN

York Court of Appeals.'
The plaintiff was employed in connection with the general
I Great Northern Railway Company v. Minnesota, 238 U. S. 340 (1915).
'Winfield v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R., Weekly Underwriter (N. Y.),
Nov. 27, 1915, p. 667.
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repair and maintenance of the tracks of the defendant railroad.
While tamping ties, he was struck in the eye by a stone which came
up from the ground. An award of compensation to the workman
under the state act was upheld on the ground that the federal act
is an assumption of Congressional control only as to liability for
injuries resulting from negligence, thus leaving the field of liability
for injuries not resulting from negligence open to state regulation.
That this workman was engaged in interstate commerce and
hence entitled to recovery only under the federal act, if his injury
had been the result of negligence, is, in view of the facts of the
decided cases, a conclusion over which there can be no dispute and
which was so considered in the principal case. A case in the Supreme
Court of the United States, 2 in which a workman who was darrying
bolts to be used in repairing a bridge over which interstate trains
were run, was held to be engaged in interstate commerce, is illustrative of this line of decisions. 3
But since the injury was the result not of negligence, but of
unavoidable accident, the question whether a recovery can be had
under the state act is governed by two considerations, zpi.: first,
whether the regulation of the liability of interstate railroads to their
employees for injuries received while engaged in interstate commerce is exclusively within the control of Congress by virtue of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution and hence prohibited to the states regardless of any action by Congress, or whether
it is a subject matter concerning which the states may legislate until
Congress has prohibited such legislation by itself regulating the
subject matter in whole or in part; and second, if the latter proposition be found to be true, whether the general subject of the liability
of interstate railroads to its employees engaged in interstate commerce can be said to consist of two separate and distinct subject
matters, one the liability for injuries resulting from negligence and
the other the liability for injuries not resulting from negligence, so
that Congressional legislation as to the first liability does not preclude state legislation as to the second liability.
The first problem can readily be resolved in favor of the second alternative. The proposition that, in the absence of Congressional action, the state has the right, in the exercise of its police
power, to enact laws determinative of the liability of employers
engaged in interstate commerce for injuries received by their employees while engaged in such commerce, admits of no argument.4
'Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 229 U. S. 146 (1913).
'See also St. L.. San Francisco, etc., Rwy. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156; N. Y.

Central R. R. v. Carr, 238 U. S. 26o (1915); Ross v. Sheldon, i4

N. W.

499 (Iowa 1915). See also the annotation of the last of these cases, elsewhere in this issue of the REviEw, 64 UNIV. OF PENNA. L. REv. 312.
'Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 55 (1912); Missouri
Pac. Rwy. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541, 544 (1912) ; Mich. Central R. R. v. Vreeland,

227

U. S. 59, 67 (1913) ; Weir v. Rountree, 173 Fed. 776 (19o9).
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Another proposition which has passed the stage of controversy
is that when Congress does act in regard to matters which have
previously been the proper subjects of state regulation, the exercise
of its authority overrides all conflicting state legislation upon the
same subject matter. 5 This leaves as the disputed point in the
principal case the question whether this liability for injuries to
employees engaged in interstate commerce is capable of division into
liability based upon negligence and liability not based upon negli-

gence.
A review of the decisions in similar cases fails to throw much
light on the probable attitude of the United States Supreme Court,
when the case is presented for final disposition by it. In the cases
involving the Federal Hours of Service Law,6 the statutes declared
unconstitutional were unquestionably regulations of the same subject concerning which Congress had already acted. As an illustration, the act of Congress having provided that a certain class of
employees should not remain on duty for more than nine hours in
every twenty-four, a New York statute, which provided that such
class of employees should not remain on duty for more than eight
hours in every twenty-four, was held unconstitutional.7
In the
cases involving the use of ferries, the inference, if any can be drawn,
is that the principal case was wrongly decided. The Interstate
Commerce Act 8 defines the term "railroad" as including "all bridges
or ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad." Under this clause it has been held that as to a ferry operated by a railroad an ordinance of a state, fixing the rates for passengers using
the ferry not in connection with the railroad, is void, since the entire
regulation of such a ferry is within the control of Congress?
Certain expressions of opinion by the Supreme Court likewise
seem to indicate that they regard the Federal Employers' Liability
'Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (185); Gloucester Ferry
Co. v. Penna., 114 U. S. 196 (i885); Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid, 2 U. S.
424

(1912).

.Act of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1415, c. 2939.
"Erie R. R. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671 (1914).
Rwy. v. Washington, 222 U. S. 37o (1912).
'Act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379.

See also Nor. Pac.

'N. Y. Central R. R. v. Hudson Co., 227 U. S. 248, 263 (913).
"It is
insisted that as the text [of the Interstate Commerce Act] only embraces
railroad ferries and the ordinances were expressly decided by the court below
only to apply to persons other than railroad passengers, therefore the action
by Congress does not extend to the subject embraced by the ordinances.
But as all the business of the ferries between the two states was interstate
commerce within the power of Congress to control and subject in any
event to regulation by the state as long only as no action was taken by
Congress, the result of the action by Congress leaves the subject, that is,
the interstate commerce carried in by means of the ferries, free from
control by the state." See also Port Richmond Ferry v. Hudson Co., :234
U. S. 317 (914).
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Act as being an assumption of Congressional control over the entire
field of liability of interstate railroads to their employees engaged
in such commerce, although in the particular cases, the distinction
between the two kinds of liability was not important and not emphasized. In Seaboard Air Line v. Horton,0 it was said: "It was
the intention of Congress [in the Federal Employers' Liability Act]
to base the action upon negligence only, and to exclude responsibility of the carrier to its employees for defects and insufficiencies
not attributable to negligence." And in an earlier case, Mich. Central
R. R. v. Vreeland," the court said: "It therefore follows that in respect to state legislation prescribing the liability of such [interstate]
carriers for injuries to their employees while engaged in interstate
commerce, this act is paramount and exclusive and must remain so
until Congress shall again remit the subject to the reserved police
power of the states."
However, as is pointed out by Mr. Justice Seabury in his opinion
in the principal case, it must be remembered that a workmen's compensation law is radically different in principle, purpose, scope and
method from an employers' liability act, and this difference is entitled to due consideration. It should also be noted that the New
York legislature, in passing the compensation act, contemplated the
present exigency by expressly providing that the act should not apply
to employees engaged in interstate commerce, for whom a rule of
liability or method of compensation had been or may be established
by the Congress of the United States.' 2

P.C.W.

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-CAN A MURDERER ACQUIRE TITLE BY
AND KEEP IT?-The authorities are most decidedly

His CRIME

in conflict in determining the status of one who murders another
and then seeks to acquire property as a result of his crime. This
situation does not present itself as infrequently as one might suppose. The problem usually arises where a beneficiary in a life insurance policy slays the person whose life was insured, but it also occurs from time to time where a devisee claims under the will of his
victim or where the murderer is the statutory heir of him whose life
he has taken.
One line of decisions, impressed by the obvious injustice of
allowing the criminal to prosper as a result of his wrong, reaches
the conclusion that the murderer does not acquire title to the property at all. This is the view universally held with regard to the
0233 U. S. 492, 501 (I914).

'Supra, note 4.
"N. Y. Laws of 1914, c. 41, § 114; Matter of Jensen v. Southern Pac.
Co., 215 N. Y. 514 (1915).
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insurance cases.' It is not necessary that there should be an express exception in the contract of insurance forbidding a recovery
under such circumstances. The death of the insured caused by the
beneficiary is regarded, on considerations of public policy, as an
implied excepted risk. In the same way, it has been frequently
held that a person who is criminally responsible for the death of
another, whether the crime be murder or
2 manslaughter, cannot take
anything under the will of the deceased.
But there are many authorities which are not so completely impressed by public policy considerations.3 These cases hold that a
murderer who happens to be the statutory heir of his victim does
acquire the legal title to the property of the deceased, and, moreover, may keep the property thus acquired. These courts proceed
upon the theory that where a statute of descent or distribution is
plain and unambiguous in its terms, there is no room for construction or interpretation, and it operates solely within its own terms,
vesting in the heir such estate as he is entitled to immediately upon
the death of the intestate. Since relationship to the decedent, and
not the conduct of the heir, is made the controlling factor in statutes
of descent, the courts feel that it would be judicial legislation if
public policy considerations were permitted to influence the decision.
These authorities distinguish between a case where the title
passes by reason of the voluntary act of the testator, i. e, by his
last will and testament, and a case where the title passes unconditionally by operation of the positive law of the state. The former
situation is regarded as analogous to those cases where a fraudulent
abuse of a contract right is held to forfeit one's rights in the contract; but since in the latter situation the law itself casts the descent, nothing can be done but strictly to follow the peremptory
mandate of the statute. In making this distinction, the courts apparently overlook the fact that our statute-books not only provide
in express terms how the property of an intestate shall devolve, but
also that no will shall be revoked except by certain enumerated acts
and under certain enumerated circumstances, among which the criminal misconduct of the devisee or legatee is not to be found. If,
'Prather v. Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 11,368 (1878);
N. Y. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 59, (1886); Anderson
v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 152 N. C. I (igIo); Filmore v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 92 N. E. 26 (Ohio IgIO); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shane, 135
S. W. 836 (Ark. igI); Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393 (i9o3); Cleaver v.
Mutual Association, I Q. B. 147 (Eng. 1892).
'In re Hall, iog L. T. Rep. 587 (Eng. 1913); In re Crippen, 104 L. T.
Rep. 224 (Eng. Igii); Riggs v. Palmer, xi5 N. Y. 5o6 (1889).
'Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203 (1895); Owens v. Owens, ioo N. C.
24o (i888); Deem v. Milliken, 6 Ohio C. C. 357 (1892); Holdim v. Ancient
Order, 159 Ill. 61g (1896); In re Gollnils Estate, 128 S. W. 292 (Minn.
I9io); McAllister v. Fair, 84 Pac. 112 (Kan. i96); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631 (1894).
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therefore, it be judicial legislation to engraft an exception upon the
terms of the statutes regulating the devolution of an intestate's
property, it is similarly judicial legislation to hold that the statutes
providing how wills shall be revoked are subject to an implied provision, namely, that legacies or devises are revoked pro tanto if the
legatee or devisee slay the testator.
In a number of jurisdictions, statutes have been enacted to meet
the situation.4 Despite this legislation, however, there has been
some doubt as to its application to particular cases, and such statutes
are usually construed strictly.5
A novel means of evading the rule that the statutory heir may
acquire title and keep it was resorted to in a Missouri case.6 It was
there held that the term "widower," as used in the statute making
him the heir in the absence of children, means one who has been
reduced to that condition by the ordinary and usual vicissitudes of
life, and not one who by a felonious act, has himself created that
condition.
The true ratio decidendi that should have been applied in all
these cases was pointed out with characteristic clearness and precision by the late Dean Ames. 7 The theory is that the legal titld
does pass to the murderer, but equity, acting in personam, will treat
him as a constructive trustee of the title because of the unconscionable mode of its acquisition, and will compel him to convey it to
the heirs of the deceased, exclusive of the murderer. The principle was thus put in Ellerson v. Westcott, the only case that clearly
bases its decision upon the theory advanced by Dean Ames: "The
relief which may be obtained against her (the murderess and devisee) is equitable and injunctive. The court in a proper action will,
by forbidding the enforcement of a civil right, prevent her from
enjoying the fruits of her iniquity. It will not and cannot set aside
the will. That is valid, but it will act upon facts arising subsequent to its execution and deprive her of the use of the property."
In the recent English case of In re Houghton,9 the court quoted
at length from the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Green in the
Pennsylvania case of Carpenter's Estate,1" and subscribed wholeheartedly to the prevalent view that where a statute casts the descent
in express teims, the courts cannot prevent the murderer from in'Tennessee, Act of 1895, p. 22, Chap. ii, § I. California, Civil Code,
§ 1409.
' SeeIn re Kirby's Estate, 121 Pac. 370 (Cal. 1912). See also Beddingfield v. Estill, 118 Tenn. 39 (1907).
'Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621 (1go8).
' Can a Murderer Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It? 45 UNIV. OF
PENNA. LAW REviEw, 225 (April, 1897).
'148 N. Y. 149 (z896).
'113 L. T. Rep. 422 (Eng. 1915).
"Supra, note 3.
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heriting his victim's property and cannot restrain his enjoyment of
the property thus acquired.
It is to be regretted that the equitable doctrine enunciated by
Dean Ames was not made the basis of this decision. The Pennsylvania case is undoubtedly correct as far as it goes, but it stops
short of the true principle. The legal title, the res, does pass to
the murderer as heir or devisee of his victim. But it should not be
forgotten that Equity, acting in personam, compels one who by misconduct has acquired a res at common law, to hold the res as a constructive trustee for the person wronged, or if he be dead, for his
representatives. It is this fundamental equitable theory that has been
overlooked in nearly all the cases in which the question has arisen,
and it is unfortunate that the case of In re Houghton did not prove
an exception.
L.E.L.

EQUITY JURISDICTION--CAN A BLACKLIST BE ENJOINED ?-Out
of the struggle between the forces of united labor and those of
capital have arisen many complicated questions of law. May organized labor lawfully strike for higher wages, shorter hours, or
improved shop conditions? Shall employees be allowed to strike
merely to compel a "closed shop"? May the members of a union
institute a boycott against one who refuses to unionize his shop, by
threatening to leave their employers unless the latter insist upon their
customers refraining from doing business with him who employs
non-union men? These are typical of the questions with which the
courts have been often confronted.
The real cause of the difficulty is the fact that in these cases
there arises a conflict between two apparent legal rights. As the
employer has a right to employ whom he chooses and to trade with
whom he will, so has the employee a legal right to refuse to work
for whom he chooses, and for any reason whatsoever. True the
employee owes to the employer a duty not to interfere with the carrying on of the employer's business, yet this same employee has
a legal right to see to his own advancement. Should a working
man be prevented from refusing to work for an employer who allies
himself with the enemies of labor, even though this action of the
employee would interfere with the employer's right to a free
market?
Some courts have attempted to solve the problem by applying
the following test: Is the object of the strike or boycott a legal one
and are legal means employed in carrying it on? Under the application of this test strikes and boycotts for higher wages, shorter
hours and improved shop conditions have been held to be lawful I
and will not be enjoined unless they are carried on in an unlawful

IPickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572 (i9o6).

NOTES

manner.' On the other hand a strike or a boycott instituted merely
to compel a closed shop has been held not to be justifiable on the
principles of competition.3 In the debatable ground between these
extremes the conflict of rights must be adjudicated as new conditions arise. In the absence of legislative action, it seems that this
is the best test that can be applied.
The task of the Court is more difficult in regard to the counter
action of the employer, the blacklist. When and to what extent
should an employer be permitted to form a combination with other
employers to refuse employment to striking employees?
In the first cases in which this subject arose the courts refused
to enjoin the defendants on the ground that the rights alleged to
be violated were personal and not property rights and that there
were no approved precedents in equity for issuing such an injunction. 4 The later decisions recognized the fact that labor, as well as
capital, is entitled to certain rights and protection from unlawful
interference, and granted injunctive relief against combinations to
blacklist.
In this connection it is interesting to note the recent case of
Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manufcturers' Association et al.'
The Court refused to grant an injunction to prevent the employers
from using a blacklist because of the doctrine, "He who seeks
equity must come in with clean hands." 6 Nevertheless it was intimated that a blacklist is open to the same legal objections as is a
boycott and if found to be unlawful will be enjoined. It seems that
the decision is proper and logical. Once the courts have decided to
lay down rules to govern this class of case, they should apply the
same tests and the same rules without considering whether it is labor
or capital, the acts of which are complained of.
It might well be said that the courts never should have been
forced to decide these questions. These struggles effect not only
the contestants in each particular case, but the entire community at
large. As the courts have no settled legal principles to guide them,
they have been forced to render their decisions upon the ground of
public policy. As a result the decisions are influenced more or less
by the personal opinions of the courts that render them.
It is submitted that this whole question, which is one of ever
'Butterick Pub. Co. v. The Union, aoO N. Y. Supp. 242 (i9o6); Chris-

tensen v. Supply Co., iio Ill. App. 61 (i9o3).
'Parvis v. Local No. 5oo, etc., 214 Pa. 348 (x9o6).
See also Boyer v.
'Worthington v. Wuring, 157 Mass. 198 (x892).
Western Union Tel. Co., 124 Fed. 246 (igo6).
5 log N. E. 643 (Mass. 1915).
'The employees had struck for higher wages and had conducted the
strike in an unlawful manner by rioting. It was because the plaintiff had
assisted in the unlawful carrying on of the strike that the court refused to
give him relief from the subsequent blacklisting conducted by the employers.
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growing importance, should be controlled by legislative action and
that not until that time will this industrial warfare be governed by
a definite and fixed set of rules and standards.
G.F.D.

FEDERAL EMPLOYERS'

LIABILITY

AcT-SCOPE

AND

APPLICA-

TION-WHEN Is AN EMPLOYEE ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE?-The first section of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
of 19o8' provides that every common carrier by 'railroad, "while
engaging" in interstate commerce, shall be liable for the injury or
death of an employee, due to negligence, "while he is employed by
such carrier in such commerce." To recover under this act, therefore, the employee must have been at the time of the injury engaged
in interstate commerce. But when is a man employed in interstate
commerce within the act? This question has frequently arisen since
the passage of the act, and has in many instances produced considerable difference of opinion among the courts.
The clearest case is one in which the injured employee was at
the time actually engaged in the operation of an interstate train.
This would apply to engineers, 2 firemen, 3 brakemen,4 and others
working on such a train. Going a step further, it has been held
that a workman who couples cars, some of which are engaged in
interstate commerce and some not, is likewise engaged in such commerce. 5 Members of switching crews at railroad terminals while
engaged in moving cars containing interstate shipments are also
held to be employed in interstate commerce, within the meaning of
the act.' But if at the moment of the accident the employee is
switching cars which contain only interstate shipments, he is not
within the act, although a few minutes before he was moving
interstate cars. 7 Moreover if a yard clerk who has the duty of
making a record of trains brought into and sent out of the terminal
yard, is killed while performing these duties with respect to an
interstate train, he is considered to fall within the act.3 This may
seem to extend the doctrine beyond its proper limits, but it is the
rule of the United States Supreme Court.
The case of persons repairing instrumentalities connected with
interstate commerce has caused the courts some difficulty. It seems
'Act Apr. 22, 1908, c. 149, § I, 35 U. S. Stat. at L. 65.
'Borton v. Seaboard Air Line Rwy. Co., 157 N. C. 146 (1911).
3
Rowlands v. Chicago & N. W. Rwy. Co., I49 Wis. 5I (1912).
'Vaughan v. St. Louis & S. F. Rwy. Co., 177 Mo. App. 155 (1914).
'Johnson v. Great Northern Rwy. Co., 178 Fed. 643 (191o).
'Montgomnery v. Southern P. Rwy. Co., 64 Ore. 597 (1913).
"Illinois Cent Rwy. Co. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473 (1914).
'St. Louis, S. F. & T. Rwy. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156 (1913).

NOTES

that one who manufactures an engine, or lays a track for future
use in interstate commerce, should be held to be preparing for such
commerce, rather than to be engaged in it. Therefore it is declared
that one who merely constructs a tunnel through which interstate
trains are expected to pass is nevertheless not engaged in interstate
commerce." But persons repairing engines or cars, or tracks or
switches, used indiscriminately in interstate and intrastate commerce, are regarded as within the act.1" In a leading case 1 an
ironworker was struck by a train and killed while carrying from a
tool car to a bridge, over which both interstate and intrastate trains
were accustomed to run, a sack of rivets which were to be used the
next morning in repairing the bridge, the repair to consist of taking
out an old girder and putting in a new one. It was held by a divided
court that the decedent was at the time of his death employed in
interstate commerce.' 2
The cases already cited constitute only a few of the large number in which the problem has arisen; but they show that the tendency of the courts is very strongly in favor of declaring a railroad
employee to have been engaged in interstate commerce within the
purview of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, whenever it is
reasonably possible so to hold. It is difficult, however, to deduce
from the cases a definite test which will serve as a touchstone in
determining whether or not a particular individual is employed in
interstate commerce.
The case of Lamphere v. Oregon, etc., Co.' 3 advances the following as a test: "Was the relation of the employment of the deceased to interstate commerce such that the personal injury to him
tended to delay or hinder the movement of a train engaged in interstate commerce?" This seems faulty, as it is conceivable that an
injury to a person employed solely in intrastate commerce might
nevertheless hinder interstate transportation. The Pedersen case,
a leading case on this question,"4 declared that the true test always
is: "Is the work in question a part of the interstate commerce in
which the carrier is engaged?" But the court said, "Of course,
we are not here concerned with the construction of tracks, bridges,
engines or cars which have not as yet become instrumentalities in
such commerce, but only with the work of maintaining them in
proper condition after they have become such instrumentalities and
'Jackson v. Chicago, St. P. & M. Rwy. Co., 21o Fed. 495 (1914).
"Northern P. Rwy. Co. v. Maerkl, 198 Fed. i (1912); Southern Rwy.
Co. v. Howerton, IO5 N. E. O25 (Ind. 1914).
'Pedersen
v. Delaware, L. & W. Rwy. Co., 229 U. S. 146 (1913).
2

' The dissenting judges thought that the work in which the deceased

was engaged at the time was not a part of commerce, but an incident which
preceded it; and that the "commerce" meant by the act was confined to transportation.

196 Fed. 336 (1912).
"Supra, note II.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

314

during their use as such." A distinction is therefore suggested between original construction of instrumentalities for future use in
interstate commerce, and the maintenance and repair of instrumentalities after they have entered into use in such commerce.
Another test has been suggested by an annotator: '1 "Did the
condition, both in respect of the source of the danger and of the
hazardous situation of the employee, arise out of the operation of
interstate commerce?" "6 A text-writer says, "All who are at the
time of the injury engaged in duty which has direct relation to the
interstate business of the carrier are entitled to the protection of the
act." 11 The same writer goes on to say,' 8 "These general terms include the vast majority of the employees of an interstate railroad who
may be affected by peril of accident, for, as railroads are practically
conducted, there are few employees whose duty is so purely local
that they have no relation to interstate traffic."
These tests are obviously all general in their terms, and are
after all of comparatively slight value when a particular set of facts
is presented for judicial decision. It is perhaps best not to seek a
technical rule which will automatically answer the problem, but
rather to examine the facts with a view to determining whether
they fall within the true spirit and intent of the Employers' Liability
Act, which, it is submitted, should in this respect be liberally construed. And there is no doubt that it has been so construed in the
vast majority of cases.
With all the precedents before it, it is easy to account for the
decision handed down in a recent case by the Supreme Court of
Iowa. 9 An electric railway company was engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce. Alongside its track was a row of
poles bearing cross-arms, on which were strung various wires, including a single wire which was part of the block signal system.
The company decided to substitute a more efficient system and for
this purpose a lineman was sent up on the poles to nail up additional cross-arms, which were to bear the old signal wire and five
or six new signal wires, all being intended for use in the new system. While so engaged, the lineman was killed by an electric shock.
It was held by five judges that at the time of his death the decedent
was employed in interstate commerce within the meaning of the
federal act. Two judges were of the opposite opinion.
It was argued by counsel for the railroad, harking back to the
distinction in the Pedersen case, 20 that the work in which the de" In 6 Neg. & Comp. Cases Annotated, p. 198.
'He says further, "It must be borne in mind in this regard that mixed
intrastate and interstate commerce constitutes interstate commerce."
" Doherty: Liability of Railroads to Interstate Employees, p. 88 (ed.

1911).

19

Idem, p. 89.

'Ross v. Sheldon, 154 N. W. 499 (Ia. 1915).
" Supra, note ii.

NOTES

cedent was engaged was not that of repair or maintenance, but was
new construction work. The court declared, however, that the work
was for the purpose of improving the road and maintaining "sufficiency in its equipment," and that in such case the distinction between "repair" and "construction" should not be drawn too fine. 21
The dissenting judges, however, clung to the view that the deceased
was not engaged in the repair of an instrumentality which had
theretofore been used in both intra and interstate commerce.
In both opinions, the Pedersen case 22 was cited as a sustaining
authority. It seems, however, that the decision of this case goes far
toward doing away with the distinction suggested in the earlier case
between construction and repair. The effect of the conclusion
reached is practically that an improvement in interstate railroad
service, even though
it really be a new construction, is a part of inter23
state commerce.

In this connection one thing,
The original Employers' Liability
that an interstate carrier should be
"any of its employees," was held

in particular, should be noted.
Act of 19o6,24 which provided
liable for injury or death of
unconstitutional because it in25

cluded all employees," whether engaged in interstate commerce or not.

The act of 19o8 2 6-the present act-was intended to
defect in the first act, by restricting liability to the
employee injured or killed "while he is employed"
commerce. The principal case illustrates the present
construe the second act to include almost all employees
carriers, and thus to render the act of 19o8 nearly as
act of 19o6.

remedy this
case of an
in interstate
tendency to
of interstate
broad as the
E.E.

Mr. Justice Evans, in rendering the opinion of the court, mentions the
fact that the old wire was to be used in conjunction with the new, and that
the additional wires therefore did not constitute an independent construction. Mr. Chief Justice Deemer, dissenting, thought that that fact was in-

material. "Surely," he says, "if the plaintiff had been engaged in the construction of another track to make a double-track road, which new track
had never been used in commerce of any kind, the use of old rails which
had once been used in interstate commerce, even as a part of a railway
engaged in interstate commerce would not affect the matter in any way."
"Supra, note 3i.
'There is a similar case, Grow v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 138 Pac.
398 (Utah 1913), which the court failed to cite. There it was held that one
employed in installing a block signal system was engaged in interstate commerce.
"'Act June ii,i9o6, c. 3073, § 1, 34 U. S. Stat. at L. 232.
'The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S.463 (i9o8).
' Supra, note i.

